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Philosophers defending evolutionary/cognitive accounts of racialism argue that cross-cultural 
psychological research has discovered similar patterns of racial reasoning around the globe. 
Such research, they hold, simultaneously supports the existence of an underlying cognitive 
mechanism for essentialist thinking while undercutting social constructionist accounts of 
racialism. I argue that they are mistaken for two reasons. First, evolutionary/cognitive 
researchers are unfamiliar with constructionist accounts of global racialism which explain 
similarities and differences in racialism. Second, evolutionary/cognitive accounts that make 
cross-cultural claims shoulder probative obligations for showing the independence of the 
cultures being compared, and these obligations have not been met. I argue that further 
evolutionary/cognitive research on racialism must account for constructionist models of 
global racialism while meeting the argumentative obligations of cross-cultural research. 
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1. Introduction 
This essay is a defense of the social construction of racialism. I follow a standard definition of “racialism” 
which is the belief that “there are heritable characteristics, possessed by members of our species, that allow us 
to divide them into a small set of races, in such a way that all the members of these races share certain traits 
and tendencies with each other that they do not share with other members of any other race” (Appiah 1990, 
4-5).1 In particular I want to defend the “radical” social-constructive thesis that holds “the concept of race is 
exclusively the product of historical and cultural causes. It claims that humans do not tend to classify people 
into races when groups with different phenotypes meet, save for particular historical circumstances” 
(Machery and Faucher 2010b, 1015; see also Mallon 2010, 272). The quoted position is the consensus view 
among historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists who study racialism but has 
recently been criticized by philosophical defenders of cognitive/evolutionary psychological (CEP) approaches 
to racialism. Drawing on developmental studies as well as historical and contemporary cross-cultural 
research, CEP philosophers point to similarities of racialism across time and space. They hold that social 
constructionist (SC) approaches to racialism cannot explain these similarities. I hold that SC approaches do 
explain these similarities and that such similarities actually pose a significant challenge to the proposed CEP 
research program on racialism. 
There are several competing cognitive mechanisms proposed in the CEP literature as to the exact 
nature of the module that causes racialism (for a summary of these competing approaches see Machery and 
Faucher 2005b, 1016–1020). What all these accounts share is the claim that “racial cognition is the by-
product of a mental mechanism that evolved for some other purpose” (Hochman 2013, 995). For my 
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purposes, the exact nature of this proposed mechanism is not as important as how the cross-cultural evidence 
is rallied to support its existence by CEP researchers. The CEP research program on racialism calls upon 
three lines of evidence: first, developmental studies of children which seem to indicate that even infants can 
distinguish between races (e.g. Hirschfeld 2012); second, a historical argument that identifies racialism in 
antiquity or non-Western cultures before contact with Europeans (e.g. Mallon 2010); third, a cross-cultural 
argument that holds that there is a similarity in racialism across the globe because “the social constructionist 
approach does not explain why races are cross-culturally thought of as biological kinds” (Machery and 
Faucher 2005b, 1016), and thus some kind of cognitive module is needed to explain such similarities. My 
focus in this paper is only on the third line of evidence. Thus, evidence such as that provided by Kurzban, 
Tooby, and Cosmides (2001) is not part of my critique because their experimental subjects were all 
University of California, Santa Barbara undergraduates. Only if such a study were replicated elsewhere and 
an argument offered that claimed that such a “cross-cultural” finding was evidence for a cognitive 
mechanism would my argument here apply. On the other hand, Hirschfeld’s enrollment of a “small flood of 
studies” across the globe that indicate that “infants are hardly blind to race” (Hirschfeld 2012, 18) is critiqued 
here, not because I am interested in the fact that he is calling upon developmental studies per se but because 
he is enrolling such studies in a cross-cultural manner. I will expand on my reasons for this in Section 3 
below, but, in short, I am critiquing CEP researchers’ employment of cross-cultural data regardless of the 
specifics of their proposed cognitive mechanisms. 
I would like to specify two ways in which the position I will defend can be considered constructionist. 
First, social constructionism, Ian Hacking reminds us, tends toward nominalism. “Constructionists,” he 
writes, “tend to maintain that classifications are not determined by how the world is, but are convenient 
ways in which to represent it. They maintain that the world does not come quietly wrapped up in facts. 
Facts are the consequences of ways in which we represent the world” (Hacking 1999, 33). A key part of my 
argument defending radical social construction hinges on this very point: we must be nominalists about 
“different” cultures. If we choose to name cultures we should always bear in mind that the names we give to 
them are products of our own invention and do not inhere in the actual structure of the (human) world. The 
position I defend has long been articulated in anthropology. In 1936, Robert Lowie argued: 
A specific culture is an abstraction, an arbitrarily selected fragment. Social tradition in some measure 
varies from family to family. Shall we, then, study a single Hopi family, the Hopi village of Walpi or 
the seven Hopi villages, the Pueblo area of North America, if not the New World as contrasted with 
the Old? There is only one cultural reality that is not artificial, to wit: the culture of all humanity at 
all periods and in all places. (Lowie 1936, 305) 
Second, I will defend a broad sense of “diffusionism” which holds that “it is not fundamental essential 
characteristics of human beings that explain history but the accidents of who we are with and have been 
with.... Talk of ‘construction’ in the social sciences is a reformulation of diffusionism” (Bloch 2005, 7–8).2 
Again, my position is neither new nor radical. At the end of the nineteenth century Franz Boas argued 
against environmental determinism of culture by claiming that “Not one observed fact can be brought 
forward in support of this hypothesis [of environmental determinism] which cannot be much better 
explained by the well known facts of diffusion of culture; for archeology as well as ethnography teach us that 
intercourse between neighboring tribes has always existed and has extended over enormous areas” (Boas 
1896, 906). 
I will show that the global similarities in racialism are better explained by constructionist models of 
diffusion than by CEP models of an underlying cognitive mechanism. I proceed as follows: First, I outline the 
CEP argument that global, cross-cultural similarities in racialism are evidence for the existence of an 
underlying cognitive mechanism that explains such similarities. Second, I outline the underlying reasoning 
process that warrants CEP philosophers’ claim that they explain this cross-cultural similarity. Additionally, I 
show how they attempt to assign probative obligations to their intellectual opponents that they themselves 
should be assuming. Third, I briefly review SC models of diffusion, interaction, and relations of racial 
thinking in modernity. I show that these models explain the very similarities that CEP researchers claim to 
have found. Fourth, I outline what is necessary for CEP to sustain claims of cross-cultural findings that would 
actually support CEP’s case for an innate, domain-specific, and species-typical mechanism that supports 
lineage-essentialist reasoning about human groups. I argue that they have failed to produce such evidence 
and outline what is entailed by an attempt to do so. 
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2. CEP and the Cognitive Mechanism Underlying Racialism 
 
Philosophers sympathetic to the evolutionary cognitive approach to racialism have argued that their 
approach to racialism is a needed supplement to social constructionist accounts of racialism because of the 
existence of similarities in racialism among unrelated cultures. According to CEP philosophers, psychological 
research has given us evidence that people generally hold beliefs that 
reflect a kind of intuitive essentialism: racial properties are viewed as stable (racial properties do not 
change during one’s lifetime), intrinsic (racial properties are thought to be caused by one’s inner 
nature), innate (the development of racial properties does not depend much on one’s rearing 
environment), and inherited (parents transmit their racial properties to their children). (Kelly, 
Machery, Mallon 2010, 443) 
CEP philosophers further argue that “racial essentialism is a product of an innate, domain-specific, and 
species-typical mechanism” (Mallon 2013, 86). The mechanism is not designed specifically to classify people 
by race. Rather, racialism is a product of a specific cognitive module selected for some other social cognitive 
function (Kelly, Machery, and Mallon 2010, 440).  
My particular target in this essay is the cross-cultural evidence they have rallied to support their case. 
CEP philosophers point to what they claim are similarities of racialism across time and space and conclude 
that “Evolutionary psychologists hold that people in many cultures and historical epochs have relied on skin 
color and other bodily features to classify their fellows, and have further believed that such classifications also 
group together people who share underlying biological commonalities” (Kelly, Machery, and Mallon 2010, 
441). This common similarity is explained by cognitive/evolutionary psychology: 
The presence of these common themes across different cultures is just what an evolutionary 
psychologist would expect, since evolutionary psychologists view racial cognition as a by-product of a 
cognitive system shared by all normally developing humans. In contrast, because socialization 
accounts cannot explain why these core elements should recur across times and cultures, they are at 
best incomplete. (Kelly, Machery, and Mallon 2010, 442) 
The existence of such cross-cultural patterns in racial thinking points to an explanatory failure of social 
constructionist (SC) accounts of racialism. Social constructionists, CEP philosophers claim, hold that racial 
thinking is a recent and local phenomenon, not a global and ancient pattern of thought. CEP philosophers 
claim that the SC account thus fails in the face of global similarities in racialism: Machery and Faucher 
maintain that “if something like the concept of race appears in many nonrelated cultures, the radical [SC] 
thesis is falsified” (Machery and Faucher 2005b, 1015, my emphasis). Thus, “traditional social constructionist 
explanations are ill-equipped to explain the stability and distinctiveness of racial representations” across the 
globe or through time (Mallon and Kelley 2010, 512). CEP, however, can explain these things by positing a 
common cause located long ago, before the human population dispersed over the planet.   
Pleas for interdisciplinary cooperation are common among CEP researchers. Machery and Faucher 
lament that “Social constructionists and evolutionary-minded social scientists avoid interacting with each 
other. This is detrimental and unjustified” (Machery and Faucher 2005a, 1217). CEP’s philosophical 
defenders often note that the refusal to incorporate psychological explanations of racialism into 
constructionist accounts displays an anti-psychological bias. Constructionists, they argue, concerned with 
uncovering the institutional and social foundations of racialism, ignore the possible harmony between their 
proposed psychological models and the social institutions that concern constructionist accounts (Mallon and 
Kelly 2012, 522–523). It is certainly true that many in the social sciences are suspicious of “reducing” 
complex institutional structures to individual cognition (Bonilla-Silva 2014; Duster 2006; Wellman 2007). In 
the United States this constructionist stance stems at least in part from what SC scholars perceive as an 
overemphasis on psychological explanations during the nineteen-fifties and nineteen-sixties (for this retreat 
from psychological and toward structural accounts of racialism see Jackson 1990; Steinberg 1995, 2007). 
CEP’s defenders argue that these concerns are misplaced and that their psychological approach is a useful 
and necessary supplement to constructionist accounts (Machery and Faucher 2005a, Mallon and Stitch 2000) 
and that a politically powerful antiracist agenda would be enhanced by recognizing the psychology behind 
racialism (Kelly, Machery and Mallon 2010; Machery, Faucher and Kelly 2010; Kelly, Faucher and 
Machery 2010; Mallon and Kelly 2012).  
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Yet, constructionists’ possibly misplaced fear of imperial cognitivists does not tell the whole story of the 
failure to integrate CEP with SC accounts of racialism. Machery and Cohen recently defended the 
evolutionary behavioral sciences against its critics by noting that the critics often limit their criticisms to a 
handful of well-cited articles. They argue that it is a mistake “to extrapolate from these few alleged 
paradigmatic articles to a whole field” since research programs seldom follow the strictures laid out in such 
articles. Moreover, these paradigmatic articles were often dated, having been published at the “end of the 
1980s and in the early 1990s” (Machery and Cohen 2012, 186). Unfortunately, CEP researchers fare equally 
poorly, or perhaps even worse, for engagement with the research program of constructionist researchers. In 
an article where they bemoan the lack of communication across disciplinary boundaries, Machery and 
Faucher (2005a) show little knowledge of constructionist theories of race. Of thirty-five sources cited in their 
article, two articles are made to stand for the entire program of social constructionists. These articles total less 
than fifty pages of reading and were woefully out of date when they were cited in 2005 (Banton 1970, Omi 
and Winant 2002 [actually a reprint that was first published in 1986]). Such a pattern of citation is not 
uncommon in the CEP literature. Not only are the cited SC pieces often dated, but they tend to be the same 
pieces again and again. An example is their reliance on an essay by Collete Guillaumin (1980) which was first 
cited by Hirschfeld in 1994 (140). This essay is repeatedly cited in CEP literature as an example of the social 
constructionist position on racialism (Gelman 2003,14, 299; 2009, 9; Gelman and Hirschfeld 1999, 403; 
Hirschfeld 1995, 1419; 1996, 22; 2002, 622; Kelly, Machery and Mallon 2010, 442; Mallon 2013, 80; 
Mallon and Kelly 2012, 513). Guillaumin’s essay is a fine piece of work, but it is thirty-five years old and 
hardly represents recent thinking on the social construction of race. Another example is that the only work of 
the long career of George Fredrickson used by CEP’s philosophical defenders is Racism: A Short History (2002; 
see Machery and Faucher 2005b, 1012; Mallon 2010, 277; Mallon and Kelly 2012, 513; Mallon 2013,77), 
which is a short survey of the topic, hardly representative of Fredrickson’s complex ideas (1971, 1981, 1995, 
1997), and even less representative of the entire research program on the construction of racialism. 
Two key claims made by CEP philosophers are completely undocumented. The first is that “the social 
constructionist approach does not explain the commonalities between the culture-specific concepts of race, 
e.g., the concepts of race in contemporary North America, in nineteenth-century France, in Germany during 
the Nazi era, and so on (Machery and Faucher 2005a, 1209–1210; see also Kelly, Faucher and Machery 
2010, 441; Mallon 2010, 281). It is telling that these assertions of the failure of SC researchers are just that: 
assertions. There is no documentation of SC researchers declaring their frustrations in explaining these 
commonalities. Indeed there is a rich body of scholarly writing that explores the commonalities among the 
three examples offered by Machery and Faucher (e.g. Kühl 2004; Hecht, 1999, 2000; Malik 1996). As I will 
show, SC researchers have little problem explaining similarities in racialism all over the globe. 
The second common claim that is virtually unsupported in CEP writings is that there is evidence that 
racialism “is found in representations of human groups independent of the European American tradition of 
scientific racialism that came to a head in the nineteenth century” (Mallon 2013, 83, my emphasis; see also 
Mallon 2010, 277-278; Kelly, Machery and Mallon 2010, 441; Machery and Faucher 2005a, 1212–1114; 
Machery and Faucher 2005b, 1015). Assertions of “independent” or “non-related” cultures are key parts of 
the CEP argument, because such assertions allow them to find the common cause in the distant past. 
Significantly, however, there is never an argument advanced to establish that this particular culture is 
“independent” from that particular culture. The idea “that human groups form distinct empirical entities” is 
widely seen by SC researchers as one of the “fossils of an earlier age” that has been abandoned in the last 
three decades (Bloch 2009, 14). By ignoring SC research, CEP researchers repeat methodological errors that 
have long been recognized in the comparative social sciences. I begin unpacking this argument in the next 
section.  
 
3. The Reasoning Behind CEP’s Cross-cultural Claims 
 
Machery and Faucher (2005a) survey the different CEP approaches to racialism outlining the strength and 
weakness for Hirschfeld’s Human Kind Module, Kurzban, Cosmides, and Tooby’s coalitional model, and 
Gil-White’s ethnies model. For each case, Machery and Faucher note how much cross-cultural evidence is 
cited, and in each case they call for more to be done to substantiate the claims made by the researchers. 
Comparative research can have many aims, one of which is to establish causal connections (Kocka 2003, 40). 
CEP researchers use comparisons to establish a causal connection between racialism across the globe to the 
common environment in which humans evolved. This is an application of Mill’s method of agreement: “If 
two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the 
circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon” (Mill 
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1851/2008, 396; see also Ember 1991). In the CEP version, it runs like this: racialism has appeared in what 
appear to be unrelated cultures. Since the cultures are otherwise unrelated, the cause of the racialism must be 
the only thing that the cultures share: the environment in the Pleistocene when they evolved the underlying 
cognitive mechanism for generalization. Thus, pointing to the cross-cultural evidence amassed by CEP 
researchers, they conclude that it is “best explained by the hypothesis that racial categorization results from a 
specialized, species-typical cognitive system that, even if it did not initially evolve to deal with racial 
categorization, has been recruited for this purpose” (Kelly, Machery, and Mallon 2010, 444).  
Variations in racial thinking or even its absence entirely in some cultures cannot, in CEP’s view, count 
against the existence of the underlying cognitive mechanism since it can be expressed in a variety of ways or 
even overridden altogether by culture and learning (Mallon 2013, 86; Kelly, Machery and Mallon 2010, 
442). On first glance, this stance would seem to immunize CEP’s claims from possible falsification: 
counterexamples to global racialism can be accounted for in the model, while any examples of global 
racialism serve as evidence in favor of the existence of the cognitive mechanisms. Rather than searching for 
counterexamples to the prevalence of racial essentialist thought, I will show how the link between global 
racialism and a cognitive mechanism that developed during the Pleistocene can be undercut by a 
demonstration of confounding causal variables that explain global racialism. Simply: if the people living in 
these cultures came into contact with other people who taught them to think racially, then there is no case 
that the cause of racial thinking lies in our distant evolutionary past and that therefore CEP researchers have 
failed to establish their case for the existence of an underlying mechanism. By examining SC models of the 
diffusion of racial thinking since modernity I will show that CEP has ignored such confounding causal 
variables in making their case. These SC models demonstrate that the contemporary societies CEP 
researchers often claim to be “independent” or “unrelated” are embedded in a global, racialist culture. 
 
4. Against a Billiard Ball World 
 
In 1982, anthropologist Eric Wolf published Europe and the People without History (1982/2010). In this massive, 
sprawling book Wolf charged any number of disciplines—history, anthropology, sociology, political science, 
economics, linguistics. among others—with, as he put it, “turn(ing) names into things” (Wolf 1982, 3). By 
reifying such concepts as culture, society, nation, etc., these disciplines distorted the reality of human 
experience. “We create false models of reality,” Wolf argued, by treating the world as if it is constituted by 
“externally distinctive and bounded objects.” By so doing “we create a model of the world as a global pool 
hall in which the entities spin off each other like so many hard and round billiard balls” (Wolf 1982, 6). Wolf 
argued for replacing our static models of reality with a study of processes: of diffusion, transfer, sharing, 
conquering and resistance:  
The world of humankind constitutes a manifold, a totality of interconnected processes.… Only by 
understanding these names as bundles of relationships, and by placing them back into the field from 
which they were abstracted, can we hope to avoid misleading inferences and increase our share of 
understanding. (Wolf 1982, 3)  
Wolf refocused scholarly attention on processes, and what emerged was a picture of the world as a single, 
unified system. “The more ethnohistory we know, the more clearly ‘their’ history and ‘our’ history emerge as 
part of the same history” (Wolf 1982, 19). Wolf’s book was a signal event in reorienting entire fields away 
from static models of self-contained units and toward dynamic models of processes that connected people 
with one another (de Munck 2000, 282). Those who studied race and racial thought were especially attuned 
to the way racial thinking was exported and imported across the globe (Verkuyten and Ter Wal 2000, 4). 
Since the nineteen eighties, scholars have been busy sketching the “complex processes of diffusion, transfer, 
adaptation, and transformation of racial ideas in various parts of the world, including their interaction with 
indigenous traditions” (Berg and Wendt 2011, 2). I will sketch two models to show how the appearance of 
racial thinking across the globe poses no specific challenges for SC models of racial formation. Some models 
about the global interconnectivity of the world are, ironically, seen as imperialistic ideologies that read the 
world through the eyes of European thought (Wacquant 1997, Swyngedouw 2004). In response, more recent 
formulations of global models of racialism have been careful to track how the commonalities of racialism are 
tailored by local agents to fit local conditions. 
Frank Dikötter argues for an interactive model that avoids the pitfalls of models of diffusion that portray 
recipients of new ideas as merely passive containers of Western imperialist ideas about racialism. In his view, 
“the interactive model of interpretation proposed here emphasizes the worldviews constructed by local 
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historical agents, analysing the complex cognitive, social and political dimensions behind the indigenization 
and appropriation of racist belief systems: put briefly, it highlights inculturation where others see 
acculturation” (Dikötter 2007, 1482). Pointing to his own work on China, Dikötter shows how Western ideas 
about race found fertile ground in seventeenth-century China onwards because of already existing ideas 
about patrilineage, increasing militarization which reinforced a social order based on kinship, and other 
ideas. These ideas, he argues, “were crucial to the emergence of new racial vocabularies, which flourished 
better in a cultural environment prepared to emphasize real or imagined physical differences between 
people” (Dikötter 2007, 1484). Such views only intensified in the nineteenth century in the face of demands 
for equality, which caused a retrenchment of the social order based on an increasingly racist discourse 
appropriated and modified for local circumstances (Dikötter 2007, 1486–1494). Dikötter’s interactionist 
model does exactly what CEP authors claim SC models cannot do: it explains the similarities between West 
and East. It does so by focusing on the channels which made possible the transfer of ideas across the globe 
rather than taking cultures as discrete entities to be compared. By so doing, Dikötter’s model explains the 
similarities in ideas, while simultaneously explaining significant differences in those ideas, by recognizing the 
agency of local actors who reshaped those ideas to fit local circumstances. CEP writers often look to 
Dikötter’s work to support their argument that racialism in China is evidence for an innate, species-typical 
cognitive mechanism (Machery and Faucher 2005b, 1015; Mallon 2010, 278; Mallon 2013, 83). They need 
to come to grips with Dikötter’s own explanatory model which actually undercuts their claims by interposing 
confounding causal variables between the Pleistocene and the flowering of racialism in China. 
A similar, though distinct, model has been offered by David Theo Goldberg who criticizes Dikötter’s 
interactionism because it demonstrates interactions “among already constituted discrete national 
configurations” (Goldberg 2009, 1274). In contrast, Goldberg offers a relational model that centers on the 
“constitutively relational aspects" of racial conceptions. While granting that the exact arrangement of these 
aspects are “no doubt deeply local in the exact meanings and resonances they exhibit,” he argues that they 
are “nevertheless almost always tied to extra- and transterritorial conceptions and expressions, those that 
circulate in wider meaning and practice" (Goldberg 2009, 1273). Embracing this relational view of racialism 
explains local variations in discourse, because racial ideas are adapted and modified to local needs and power 
structures. At the same time, however, “racial ideas, meanings, exclusionary and repressive practices in one 
place are influenced, shaped by and fuel those elsewhere. Racial ideas and arrangements circulate, cross 
borders, shore up existing or prompt new ones as they move between established political institutions” 
(Goldberg 2009, 1274). Refocusing scholarly attention on the relations between racial practices and ideas 
inverts normal conceptualization of racialism. “This, in short, might better be characterized as the 
globalization of the racial than as the racialization of the globe” (Goldberg 2009, 1275). 
I have only sketched Dikötter’s and Goldberg’s ideas here in order to illustrate that SC scholars are 
more than up to the challenge of explaining both the local and the global appearance of racial ideas. Nor are 
these the only two models available to SC scholars, as this kind of thinking has flourished in the past three 
decades. In a recent survey of such theories, methods, and studies, Rogers Brubaker argues that “a growing 
body of work has reframed the study of ethnicity, race, and nationalism in broader and more integrated 
terms ... that construes ethnicity, race, and nationhood as a single integrated family of forms of cultural 
understanding, socialization, and political contestation” (Brubaker 2009, 22). The important point for my 
present argument is Brubaker’s conclusion: 
The field is global. By global I do not mean that the field covers all world regions, although it does in 
fact do so. I mean rather that the field is increasingly informed by an understanding of the world as a 
single integrated social, economic, political, and cultural space. Varying configurations of ethnic, 
racial, and national classification, social organization, and political claims-making are increasingly 
understood to have been generated by structural and cultural transformations that have been global 
in scope, though regionally differentiated in their effects. (Brubaker 2009, 23) 
By rejecting the billiard-ball notion of independent cultures, SC theorists can account for racial similarities 
across the globe. Two points follow. First, when SC theorists find examples of racialism in different places, 
they do not need to supplement their accounts with psychological accounts about generalizing cognitive 
mechanisms because such mechanisms are, as Hochman argues, “explanatorily redundant” (Hochman 2013, 
1002). To do so would be “as if someone proposed to account for the pattern of motor traffic in London with 
an explanation of how the internal combustion engine functions” (Bloch 2005, 14). Second, and more 
fundamentally, the appearance of similar racial ideas across the globe cannot serve as evidence for the 
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existence of general psychological mechanism because there are confounding causal variables relating to the 
diffusion of racial ideas across the globe.  
The methods employed by SC researchers who treat the globe as a single culture and those of CEP 
researchers conducting cross-cultural/comparative research are very different. The process of comparison 
treats examples as “independent cases that are brought together analytically by asking for similarities and 
differences between them. In other words, the comparison breaks continuities [and] cuts entanglements” 
(Kocka 2003, 41). This method is in tension with the notion of “entangled histories” which “is interested in 
travelling ideas, migrating people, and transnational commerce” (Kocka 2003, 42; see also Kolchin 2009, 
579). CEP’s program, which treats cultures as independent ontological entities, faces vexing problems. In the 
next section I will demonstrate these problems. 
 
5. Galton’s Problem: An Unsolved Problem in the CEP Program 
 
Anthropology was the discipline in which comparative/cross-cultural research was most fully developed, and 
there were two methods of comparative anthropological research. First are those methods which made a 
statistical comparison of a large number of cases in which cultural traits were abstracted and fitted into a 
taxonomy developed for the purposes of such a comparison. George Murdock’s Cross-Cultural Survey at 
Yale’s Institute of Human Relations is the most developed and famous example of this approach. Murdock 
had data on three hundred societies that he placed in seven hundred categories as he sought cross-cultural 
generalizations. The second approach took a much more limited number of cases and performed a careful 
and controlled comparison of cultures within a carefully specified region. British structural functionalism was 
the best example of this approach. Each tradition declined at (least in part) for reasons outlined above: the 
increasing recognition that modernity and capitalism, and their child imperialism, had interconnected the 
world in such a way as to frustrate the ambitions of such approaches (Brettell 2009, 651–653). The same 
problems that frustrated these two research programs remain for any proposed CEP research program that 
wants to claim evidence from cross-cultural research. 
What is important for my present purposes is that the cross-cultural approach of CEP does not seem to 
fit neatly in either of these traditions: it has not generated enough examples of racialism to make a statistical 
comparison meaningful. However, its method of seeking out only markers of racialism alone, rather than 
deep understandings of an entire culture, means it does not really fit the second method either. What I will 
show in the remainder of this paper is that CEP researchers have thus failed to meet the probative 
obligations that accompany the kind of claims they are making about the existence of their psychological 
mechanism. 
CEP theorists have a number of cross-cultural examples where they have claimed to have discovered 
racialism. Lawrence Hirschfeld has pointed to experimental evidence from North America, China, Israel, 
Ethiopia, and Korea that infants recognize race and prefer their own race. He claims that this literature is 
“refreshingly global in scope” (Hirschfeld 2012, 18). We can add to his list perhaps a few more nations from 
the CEP literature, such as Gil-White's study in Mongolia (Gil-White 2001a), but not many more. 
Nineteenth-century anthropologists would have sneered at this tiny sample size. In what is considered the 
very first work of comparative anthropology, Edward B. Tylor formulated a theory of the “formation laws of 
marriage and descent” based on data he had collected from “between three and four hundred peoples, 
ranging from insignificant savage hordes to great cultured nations” (Tylor 1889, 246). When he presented his 
paper, the very first question, posed by Francis Galton, deflated his results. “It was extremely desirable for 
the sake of those who may wish to study the evidence for Dr. Tylor's conclusions,” Galton argued, “that full 
information should be given as to the degree in which the customs of the tribes and races which are 
compared together are independent” (Tylor 1889, 270). “Galton’s problem,” as it came to be called, would 
vex comparative methodologies from that time forward. 
Several statistical solutions have been proposed for Galton's problem, but there is no firm consensus as 
to its solution (Naroll 1961, Strauss et.al. 1975, Ember, Ember and Peregrine 2015). The statistical version of 
the problem does not (yet) arise for CEP, because they do not have enough examples to make statistical 
analysis such as these possible. But Galton’s problem also involves cultural, not statistical, independence, and 
this problem does arise for CEP. If cultures are related to each other, then the similarities among them could 
be explained by cultural rather than psychological causes. In order to make cultural invariance count as 
evidence for an evolved psychological mechanism, CEP must show that there are cultures without a shared 
cultural environment, in order to trace the cause back to the Pleistocene.  
Even so, as Hochman argued, “we should be wary of easy arguments from the universality of a trait to 
the existence of an adaptation dedicated to that trait. Just as not everything that has evolved is universal, not 
   
	
OPEN ACCESS – Freely available at philosophyandtheoryinbiology.org	
JACKSON — CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH  8 
everything that is universal has evolved” (Hochman 2013, 999). Nor is universality necessarily proof of 
cultural diffusion from a common source; facts such as dogs making dogs and cats making cats can be 
learned in different ways. As Hochman concludes, “what science tells the North American students, 
experience tells the Itzaj [in South America] (Hochman 2013, 999). This too, is an old idea in the human 
sciences, dating back at least to Franz Boas's dictum that “unlike causes produce like effects” (Boas 1887, 
485). “It is of very rare occurrence that the existence of like causes for similar inventions can be proven,” 
Boas argued in 1887; “on the contrary, the development of similar ethnological phenomena from unlike 
causes is far more probable, and due to the intricacy of the acting causes” (Boas 1887, 485). Put simply, the 
global distribution of racial thinking carries with it two sets of probative obligations: first, to show that 
racialism has a common cause at all and, second, to show that diffusionist models cannot explain global 
racialism. Accepting CEP explanations for psychological mechanisms depends on a demonstration of the 
“the failure of rival explanations” (Sesardic 2003, 430; also Hochman 2013, 995). In terms of their cross-
cultural claims, CEP theorists have not met these obligations.  
To demonstrate the unmet probative obligations on CEP research, I will examine a recent case made 
by a CEP philosopher, Ron Mallon's (2013) “Was Race Thinking Invented in the Modern West?” Mallon 
argues that “lineage essentialism,” a key part to racialism, appears in two different cultures and that these 
cases provide good evidence for the existence of an underlying cognitive mechanism. I will examine each 
case to show two things: first, that there is no evidence that the cultures, Brazil and Madagascar, are 
“independent” of European/North American racial traditions.; second, that a more nuanced understanding 
of the cultures should make us doubt that CEP researchers have understood the “racialism” they have 
claimed to discovered.  
 
5.1 Brazil 
 
Mallon (2013) examines Brazil as an example of how “lineage essentialism is found in representations of 
human groups independent of the European American tradition of scientific racialism that came to a head in 
the nineteenth century, supporting an evolutionary cognitive explanation of lineage essentialism about 
human groups” (83, my emphasis). Mallon argues that SC researchers hold that Brazilian racial categories 
are, generally, much more fluid than in the United States. Recent experimental evidence, however, such as 
that supplied by Jones (2009), has shown that Brazilians do think in lineage-essentialist terms. This counts as 
evidence for the CEP account because “evolutionary cognitive accounts suggest that we ought to expect 
strong overlap in classification judgments of nonmixed race persons between the United States and Brazil, 
and this is just what we find. In both countries, a child of two parents of the same race is typically classified as 
a member of that race (when the parent's race is known)” (Mallon 2013, 85). 
 
5.1.1 Is Brazil “Independent” of Global Racialism?  
 
Mallon concludes his discussion of Brazil by noting “While the Brazilian experimental evidence is powerful, it 
remains consistent with the idea that racial essentialism was introduced in modern Europe and America and 
somehow imported by Brazil” (Mallon 2013, 85, my emphasis). However, Mallon merely asserts that Brazil is 
independent of European/North American racial traditions. Even a cursory examination of interconnections 
between Brazil and such European/North American racial ideologies makes clear that there is no need to 
speculate that “somehow” racial ideologies appear in Brazil. To begin with, there is reason to think that no 
importation was necessary. Recent work on the history of racialism has made a good case for relocating its 
origins from the metropole to the colonies (Anderson 2014, Stoler 1997, Seth 2014). Jorge Cañizares-
Esguerra has shown that European colonists in Latin America began arguing against theories of 
environmental determinism in order to fix race in the inherited bodily characteristics of their colonial 
subjects long before those they left behind in Europe. They did so precisely because they wanted to assure the 
homeland that there was no danger of the environment turning them into natives (Cañizares-Esguerra 1999, 
2006).  
Proto-racist ideas were brought from the Portugal to Brazil, where they were hardened because of the 
ideological necessity of propping up the Atlantic slave trade (Sweet 1997). Far from being independent of 
lineage essentialism, Latin America was one of its cradles. Historians continue to map a history of an 
interconnected Atlantic world that traces the origins of racial and ethnic thinking without reifying national 
boundaries (Sidbury and Cañizares-Esguerra 2011). Comparisons of Brazil and the United States, such as 
Mallon's, serve “to isolate the two places, overshadowing the constant communication between them and the 
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mutual construction of their images” (Wade 2004, 358; see also Andrews 1996). There is little need to jump 
back to the Pleistocene to find a common causal factor in Brazilian and US racialism.  
 
5.1.2 Has CEP Research Properly Understood “Racialism” in Brazil? 
 
We have a SC explanation for the differences between the two sets of psychological evidence presented by 
Mallon. Gil-White (2001b), a key researcher on whom Mallon relies, points out that previous psychological 
studies had established a “consensus that has emerged from this research is that racial categories in Brazil are 
fluid (interpersonally, and perhaps also inter-temporally variable), fuzzy (without clear boundaries), and 
ambiguous (admitting of different, imperfectly overlapping labels)” (Gil-White 2001b, 221). Gil-White argues 
that improved methodology in the questioning process would uncover that Brazilians do indeed share much 
more with North American racialism than previously established (though Gil-White has not yet conducted 
such research). Thus, Gil-White, and Mallon following him, conclude that our conceptions of racial identity 
are constrained by an underlying cognitive mechanism. 
It may be that a more nuanced understanding of Brazilian racial politics could explain the divergence 
between these two sets of findings. One criticism of Gil-White's (2001a) research on Mongols and Kazakhs is 
that he does not explain changes in racial attitudes over generations (Rong 2001, Hochman 2013, 1001). In 
Brazil, Gil-White proposes to explain an intergenerational change in racialism by pointing to improved 
methodology in psychological testing, but it is not at all clear that such a methodology is needed to explain 
the intergenerational change. Much of evidence that Gil-White and Mallon are refuting is quite old, much of 
it flowing from a research program of Marvin Harris from the nineteen-sixties (e.g. Harris and Kottack 1963, 
Harris 1970). Jones conducted his research, and Gil-White issued his critique, decades later. A constructionist 
perspective would ask if the social climate surrounding racial issues has changed in the decades between the 
two sets of results. Psychological studies are not “not separate from the phenomenon they were studying—they 
were themselves part of it” and, thus, “failure to replicate does not, as in other disciplines, mean that we have 
to re-examine the original methods and procedures until we have diagnosed a mistake” (Richards 1987, 207; 
see also Richards 2002, 2012). It may well be that Brazilian racial attitudes changed between the original 
studies in the nineteen sixties and subsequent studies conducted three decades later.  
Both Gil-White and Mallon point to a consensus in the “literature on the cognitive models of race in 
Brazil” (Gil-White 2001b, 221) that racial beliefs in Brazil are substantially different than in North America. 
Had they looked to anthropology, history, sociology, or political science, they would have found an opposite 
consensus. “The debate has moved on somewhat from the question of whether or not racialism exists in 
Brazil and other Latin American countries,” writes anthropologist Peter Wade; “it is unquestionable that it 
does” (Wade 2004, 357). Studies done in the nineteen-sixties and seventies were conducted during a time 
when discussions of race were expressly forbidden by the ruling military government (Coates 2007, 324). 
This policy was consistent with a narrative common in the first half of the twentieth century that presented 
Brazil as a racial democracy where racial stereotyping barely existed. “Brazilian students of race relations 
could not but deny race any political significance in the modern Brazilian social configuration … in the 
1950s and 1960s” (da Silva 2004, 720). Researchers working under the spell of modernization theory and 
funded by UNESCO explained away any counter-evidence that pointed to the existence of racialism by 
appealing to “the persistence of traditional strongholds in the ‘yet to be modernized’ Brazilian social space,” 
since racist ideology was so prevalent in previous centuries (da Silva 2004, 720). In other words, scholars had 
no need to jump back to our distant evolutionary past, since the presence of racist ideology was so well-
understood in Brazil, although believed to be waning under the expected modernization of the country.  
Beginning in the nineteen-seventies, there has been much more open communication about the 
widespread racialism experienced by people of color in Brazil (Andrews 1996, 483; Sousa and Nascimento 
2008; Telles and Sue 2009). The earlier ideology in which Brazil was held to be racially different from North 
America and the discouragement of open discussion of racialism are now seen as “cultural censorship” 
(Sheriff 2000). Indeed, the ideology of fluid racial categories was used strategically throughout the twentieth 
century to reinforce rather than undermine racialism, “to see mixture and hybridisation as inherently opposed to 
racial absolutism and essentialism is quite wrong” (Wade 2004, 356). “The importance of these studies 
[conducted since the nineteen-seventies] does not reside in any theoretical innovation regarding the workings 
of racial subjection in Brazil.” The importance rests on the notion that modernization will not bring about 
the end of racialism and in increasing recognition of the reality of racial oppression that is a consequence of 
Brazil's so-called “fluid” racial categories (da Silva 2004, 720). The kinds of social scientific inquiry done in 
mid-century Brazil are often now seen as a product of an ideology that incorrectly drew sharp contrasts 
between the racialism of Brazil and the United States (Agier 1995: Guimarães 1995, 209-211) and that, in 
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fact, "a national ideology promoting race mixture and multiracial identification has actually created a 
situation in which racialism can thrive” (Telles and Sue 2009, 134). So, rather than uncovering evidence of 
an underlying cognitive mechanism, CEP’s experimental evidence could actually be a product of shifting 
social and cultural patterns of Brazil’s racial conditions. This specific case instantiates Hochman's more 
general argument that it is mistake to separate out racialism from racism because “historically, racism has 
gone hand in hand with racialism. Furthermore, the negative value judgments associated with racism, and 
also ethnocentrism, may play a role in essentialist thinking about the ‘other’” (Hochman 2013, 1003). 
 
5.2 Madagascar 
 
Brazil is not Mallon's only example of racialism. He also points to the appearance of lineage essentialism in 
Madagascar. Here, Mallon relies on a study conducted by Rita Astuti, an anthropologist with a long history 
of studying the Vezo, a fishing group on the coast of Madagascar, who worked with Gregg Solomon and 
Susan Carey, two cognitive developmental psychologists (Astuti, Solomon and Carey 2004). Mallon reports 
the results of their experiments: 
When given an “adopted at birth task” in which Vezo children are raised by Masikoro (an inland 
group) or Karany (descendants of immigrants to Madagascar from the Indian subcontinent), adult 
Vezo consistently judge that group identity is fixed by way of life (2004, Study 1, pp. 44ff.), fitting 
with earlier ethnographic work on Vezo conceptions of Vezo identity. However, 6–13 year old 
children show an adopted parent bias (the child will have the group identity of the adopting parents) 
when the switch is Vezo-Masikoro, but a birth parent bias when the switch is Vezo-Karany. (Mallon 
2013, 85) 
Such evidence, he claims, is “(admittedly prima facie) evidence against both culturally-transmitted theories 
and culturally-transmitted essentialist construals (for both would predict that the absence of essentialism 
about human groups is the default)” (Mallon 2013, 85–86).  
 
5.2.1 Is Madagascar “Independent” of Global Racialism? 
 
The absence of racialism is not the “default” position of the social constructionist in an interrelated world. 
Indeed, the constructionist position would seek different modes of transmission for ideas into this region of 
the world. Madagascar has long been a global crossroads for different groups of people. The island was first 
settled by people from Indonesia despite the island's proximity to Africa (Adelaar 2009) and the languages on 
the island are part of the Asian, not African, language groups (Bouwer 2005). For centuries the Malagasy 
peoples have been trading throughout the Indian Ocean (Crossland 2013, 7–10). Since the nineteenth 
century, the island has been marked by continual disputes about a national identity, and these disputes 
continued after the country escaped from French colonial rule in 1960 (Bouwer 2005). In the past twenty-five 
years, the number of tourists, drawn by the incredible eco-diversity of the island, has quadrupled, despite 
several political crises that the island has experienced (Walsh 2012, xiii). When surveyed in this long historical 
context, we find that “the references for collective identities are multiple, heterogeneous and non-exclusive. 
Madagascar offers a number of examples of this pluri-identity and of the strategically different use that 
persons and groups can make of it. The different identities are inter-related and inserted in human relations” 
(Alvarez 1995, 82). Given that the “default” position is not the absence of racialism but its presence, 
especially in a formerly colonized territory, it is incumbent upon CEP researchers to explain why these 
potentially confounding causal factors do not throw serious doubt onto their claims about cognitive 
mechanisms.  
The Vezo, the particular people of interest in the research Mallon cites, are not immune to this 
interconnected world; indeed the areas on the island they occupy have been in contact with Europeans since 
the sixteenth century (Marikandia 2001, 158). The Vezo's traditional fishing lifestyle means they are in 
constant negotiations with neighbors about fishing rights and boundaries, marking off where they may fish 
and where they may not. Their fishing lifestyles are entwined with national and global economies (Iida 2009; 
Tucker et. al. 2011, 294). The particular community studied by Astuti, on whom Mallon relies, is not cut off 
from the rest of the world and, indeed, lies in close proximity to a town with an airport, post office, and 
market. Moreover, it has become a very busy tourist attraction in the past thirty years (Astuti, et. al. 2004, 
18). On a more local level, the intermarriage of Vezo with the Masikoro, their agricultural and pastoral 
neighbors is common (Dina 2001; Tucker et. al. 2011).  
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5.2.2 Has CEP Research Properly Understood “Racialism” in Madagascar? 
 
Ideas of lineage essentialism are indeed present among the Vezo, for example, to explore the difference 
between Vezo vatane (who live by the sea and fish) and the Vezo-potake (who have moved to the village or city 
and do not fish). What Mallon calls “lineage essentialism” is certainly present in these questions for the Vezo: 
how can “a potential successor of a patriarchal ritual clan or lineage pole holder who has converted to 
Christianity and who refuses the cult of ancestors, be considered a ‘true Vezo’? Similarly, how could an 
urban Vezo, visiting the village and not even sitting on the ground, while all the elders are found there, go 
back to being a true Vezo again?” (Marikandia 2001, 158–9).  
It would be incorrect then for a CEP researcher to claim, as Mallon does, that “Vezo consistently judge 
that group identity is fixed by way of life” (Mallon 2013, 85, my emphasis); indeed such a claim cuts against 
Astuti's close analysis of how the Vezo conceptualize identity. Her argument is that identity is never “fixed;” 
rather it is a process that needs to be continually made and remade. “Vezo adults know that their babies get 
their physiognomy from their birth parents, but choose to state otherwise,” she writes (Astuti 2007, 14). The 
cultural significance of their claim rests on the importance that parents in Vezo communities do not have 
exclusive rights to their children, the children are the responsibility of everyone in the village (Astuti 1995, 
2007). Astuti's position is a good example of what Hochman (2013) called the “wealth of stimulus” argument: 
the Vezo know that their children resemble their parents, because the evidence of their eyes tells them so. As 
Hochman noted, “nativist theories are only compelling when learning cannot account for the relevant data. 
However, the fact that cats beget cats, and dogs beget dogs, and that they somehow transmit catlike natures 
and doglike natures, is not ecologically opaque” (Hochman 2013, 999). And neither, I would argue, is the 
fact that children physically resemble their parents. What seems much more interesting is that the Vezo are 
taught to also claim that children resemble those to whom they are not biologically related. This is because 
their social/cultural goals are to expand kinship relations far beyond the biological parents. “While this 
objective is inherent to the Vezo undifferentiated system of kinship reckoning, which is inclusive rather than 
exclusive,” Astuti concludes, “people also actively pursue this end in their everyday practices” (Astuti 2007, 
10). There is good reason to doubt that the complexity of racialism among the Vezo is adequately captured 
by the kind of psychological experiments relied on by Mallon. 
Even if we grant that the psychological experiments described by Mallon have found some underlying 
racialism, have they discovered the same thing that was discovered in Brazil and is so prevalent in the United 
States and Europe? As Astuti noted, “comparison requires commensurability” (Astuti et. al. 2004, 12). In 
what sense is the community of Vezo commensurable with other examples CEP researchers rely on? Like 
Galton’s problem, this question dates back to 1889, when Dr. Flower raised a second objection to Tyler's 
work: “It was, however, perfectly obvious that the value of such a method depended entirely upon the units 
of comparison being of equivalent value, and this seemed to him to be a very great difficulty when dealing 
with groups of mankind” (Tyler 1889, 271). “Flower’s question,” as it came to be known (Korotayev and de 
Munck 2003), involves a question of scale. Mallon (2013) has two examples of inheritance thinking: Brazil 
and the Vezo. Are these two equivalent examples? Brazil is a huge, industrializing, multi-ethnic country. The 
Vezo are small groups on the coast of Madagascar. Do we count the Vezo vatane as separate from or the same 
as the Vezom-potake? In what sense, exactly, does an enormous industrial culture like Brazil have similarities or 
differences to a small group in Madagascar? “It may be that the differences between industrial and foraging 
cultures,” concludes one comparativist anthropologist, “are so vast and complex that for some questions it 
would be hard, if not impossible, to find items that have a comparable functional niche” (de Munck 2000, 
280; see also Gatewood 2000). Flower's question, even when not called that, is an ongoing research program 
among those struggling to describe the tensions between global and local, between particular communities 
and vast capitalist transnational systems (Swyngedouw 2004). In a review of the studies searching for 
essentialism, Heinrich and his colleagues find that the “evidence is not well suited to examining differences in 
the degree of psychological essentialism across populations” (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010, 69), 
because of the vast different social structures of the societies under examination. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The cross-cultural evidence for the existence of a species-typical cognitive mechanism that accounts for 
racialism faces significant problems that CEP researchers need to address. Moreover, the methods of 
cognitive psychology are hardly uniform in their findings. More recent studies have been much more 
equivocal in their findings about the very areas of the world that I have examined here: Latin America and 
Madagascar. Denis Regnier found that, among other ethnicities in Madagascar, lineage essentialism did not 
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arise until the colonial period on the island, just as SC research would predict. Regnier’s psychological 
experiments to uncover the source of racialism could not be interpreted to show the existence of a cognitive 
model that accounts for it (Regnier 2015). More recent research fails to find evidence of any underlying 
cognitive mechanism for racialism. Tamara Hale's psychological experiments among the Yapatera of Peru 
showed their cognitive processes were in line with their non-essentialist ideology of race: 
The results of the experimental studies confirm the ethnographic account of the folk theory of race 
that villagers in Yapatera articulate in their everyday lives and interactions. Despite their exposure to 
essentialist constructions of race, villagers used their non-essentialist folk theory to inform their 
reasoning in the tasks. (Hale 2015, 148) 
Such research should continue in the future, but it must be done in closer conversation with the methods and 
theories of social constructionist research. I agree with the plea of CEP researchers that the evolutionary 
cognitive researchers and social constructivist researchers need to be in closer communication. However, 
rather than faulting SC researchers for neglecting CEP approaches, I argue that the opposite is a much 
greater problem. CEP researchers make claims about “independent” cultures without coming to grips with 
the probative obligations that are concomitant with such a claim. These obligations, I should stress, have 
been well understood for over a century. I agree with two anthropologists who are sympathetic to CEP 
approaches when they find that “behavioral scientists should pay more attention to the work of 
cultural/social anthropologists, since these are the scientists who have made human variability their main 
focus,” because “the solution cannot be ... to administer studies upon studies to the billions of (poor) people 
around the world who remain untapped by the behavioral sciences” (Astuti and Bloch 2010, 84). Rather, it 
requires researchers to be sensitive to the complexity of human culture and cognition—a sensitivity that can 
only arise from a true collaboration between evolutionary/cognitive psychologists and those working in 
anthropology, history, and sociology. 
 
Notes 
 
1. Appiah distinguishes “racialism” which is the belief that races can be distinguished from each other 
from “racism” which adds value judgments to establish racial hierarchies. Machery and Faucher 
(2005a, 1208) follow this line as well. Hochman (2013) critiques the distinction on the basis that 
racialism cannot be so easily separated from racism as value judgments may be constitutive of racialism 
itself. I agree with Hochman and return to this point in section 5.1.2 of the present paper. 
2. Bloch does suggest that diffusionist explanations are overused in the social sciences, however. 
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